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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD A. RICHE,
REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS NO:
860099-CA

NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION, a Utah
Professional Corporation,

SUPREME COURT NO:
880443

Defendant/Appellant.

(CATEGORY NO. 13)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Utah
Cede Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (a) and Rule 43 of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court.

A decision of the Court of Appeals

was entered on October 27, 1988.

This Court granted Peti-

tioner's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari by an Order dated
January 11, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUED PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the Trial
Court's judgment for reasons somewhat different than those
relied

on by

Redemption

the Trial

Agreement,

Court
although

by

finding
valid,

that

was

the

Stock

inapplicable

because of an involuntary transfer and a subsequent disqualification,

allowing

the

professional

dissolved u^dcr 11

i

corporation

to

be

STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-7 of the Utah Professional
Corporation Act provides:
A
professional
coiporation
may
issue the shares of its capital stock
only to persons who are duly licensed to
render the same specific professional
services as those for which the corporation was organized. A shareholder may
voluntarily transfer his shares in a
professional
corporation
only
to
a
person who is duly licensed to render
the same specific professional services
as those for which the corporation was
organized.
Any shares issued in violation of this- section are void.
Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13 of the Utah Professional
Corporation Act provides:
The articles of incorporation may
provide for the purchase or redemption
of the shares of any shareholder upon
the death or disqualification of such
shareholder, or the same may be provided
in the by-laws or by private agreement.
In the absence of such a provision in
the
articles
cf
incorporation,
the
by-laws, or by private agreement, the
professional corporation shall purchase
the shares of a deceased shareholder or
a shareholder no longer qualified to own
shares in such corporation within 90
days after the death of the shareholder
or disqualification of the shareholder,
as the case may be. The price for such
shares shall be their reasonable fair
value as of the date of death or disqualification of the shareholder.
If
the corporation shall fail to purchase
said shares by the end of said SO days,
then the executor or administrator or
other
personal
representative
:f a
deceased shareholder or any disqualified

shareholder may bring an action in the
district court of the county in which
the principal office or place of practice of the professional corporation is
located for the enforcement of this
provisionThe court shall have power
to award the plaintiff the reasonable
fair value of his shares, or within its
jurisdiction, may order the liquidation
of the corporation.
Further, if the
plaintiff is successful in such action,
he shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs.
The
professional
corporation
shall
repurchase such shares without regard to
restrictions upon the repurchase of
shares provided by the Utah Business
Corporation Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dr. Richard Nilsscn is a medical doctor who has been
practicing medicine in Cgcer., Uta'o. - since 1958 (T. 452} and
subsequently

joined

in

practice

with

Dr.

Chauncey

Michaelscn, becoming partners in 1961.

In 1970 they formed

the corporation

Professional

known

as North

ration, the Petitioner herein.

Ogden

The corporation

Corpo-

issued to

Dr. Nilsson 1,000 shares of stock in the Petitioning corporation, having a par value of $1.00 per share and redemption
value of $1,000.00. (R. 120)

The relevancy of the aforesaid

facts and the facts stated infra, is that the entire matter
before this Court: evolves around the 1,000 shares of stock
issued to Dr. Richard Nilsson.
Dr. Richard Nilsson filed a Chapter 13 Petition in the
:or the District cf Utah,

3

Northern

Division, No. B76-633, seeking

a Chapter

13 ar-

rangement. (R. 118)
The filing cf the Chapter 13 arrangement was frustrated
primarily by the present Respondent, Edward A. Riche, and as
a result thereof, a Chapter 7 Petition was filed, which, in
accordance with the Bankruptcy Act, and also in accordance
with the present Bankruptcy

Code, refers the date of the

filing of the Chapter 7 to the date of the original filing
of the Chapter 15.
On the filing of the Chapter 7, -he Bankruptcy Court
appointed Attorney James E. Davis as Trustee on behalf of
-he Court, ar.d it was the duty of. the Trustee to obtain for
the benefit of credituis, all <.•_ the assets of the bankrupt:
petitioner

which

were

not

exempt

under

the

exemptions

provided for by -he State of Utah. (R. 118-119)
Ax: the time of the formation of the North Ogden Professional Corporation in 1970, a Stock Redemption Agreement was
executed by the corporation

and

us

shareholders.

{Peti-

tioner's Exhibit 28D)
The record before the Court evidences that Dr. Chauncey
Michaelson, a medical doctor and shareholder, made a bid to
the Court for the purchase of the ",0CC shares of stock of
Dr. ICilsson, in accordance with the Stcck Redemption Agreement entered

intr berwe^r

the ca:**.c?

d

3

t

the titu cf the

formation

of the corporation

in

accordance with the Bankruptcy

1970, and

the Court, in

Act, on December

3, 19 81,

gave notice to all creditors of Dr. Richard Nilsson as the
debtor,

thai

an

offer

had

been

made

to

the

Trustee

in

Bankrputcy, James Z. Davis, to pay that sum, thereby fully
advising all persons present as to the nature of the interest they were purchasing from the Court.
Notwithstanding

(R. 242-243)

the offer and tender of $1,000.00 by

Dr. Chauncey Michaelson, a medical doctor and shareholder in
the Petitioning corporation, made to the Bankruptcy Court,
the Court authorized the sale to the Respondent of whatever
interest the Trustee had in the corporation, subject to the
Repurchase Agreement and applicable Utah law.
Respondent

subsequently

filed

an

action

to

(R. 243)

The

liquidate

the

Petitioning corporation, seeking to assert the shareholder's
right because of a purchase mace from the Bankruptcy Court,
even though a private agreement was known to the Respondent
as set forth in Exhibit 28D, and even though the Articles of
Incorporation

(R. 174) evidences in paragraph XII thereof

the qualifications of a person who may be a shareholder.
The District

Court held that the Respondent was the

sole owner cf all rights, title and interest in 1,000 shares
of the Petitioner, that the Respondent's demand for redemption had 3 reasonable fair va.lue, was raace timely ur.der the

5

terms

of

the

Stock

Redemption

Agreement

visions of the Utah Code Annotated

and/or

the pro-

§ 16-11-13, that the

Defendant did not take the appropriate steps for redemption
under the terms of the Stock Redemptic:: Agreement, nor did
the Petitioner ccmply with the terms of Utah Code Annotated
§

16-11-13.

The

Petitioner

was

ordered

to

immediately

dissolve its corporation and marshal all assets, provide for
all legal liabilities, with the balance of the assets to be
distributed to the shareholders in the same ratio as their
respective

stock

ownerships

as

reflected

at

finally, that the Respondent was awarded

trial,

and

Court costs and

reasonable attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Utah Court
Trial

Court

erred

in

finding

of Appeals
that

the

held

Stock

thjt the
Redemption

Agreement was ambiguous and went on to hold 'that the Stock
Redemption Agreement was not ambiguous with respect to the
meaning of par value since "par value" is a term cf art and
the document which should state par value, die so unambiguously.
Stock

The Utah Court of Appeals
Redemption

Agreement

did

further
not

found that the

contain

"extensive

notices" or "procedural steps" which \<ere in any way inconsistent with

"par value" meaning par value.

But the Utah

Court cf Appeals did gc en tc hold that for reasons somewhat

6

different than those relied on by the Trial Court, that the
Trial Court decision should be affirmed.
First of all the Utah Court of Appeals held that the
Articles and Stock Redemption Agreement, although prohibiting the transfer of stock to anyone who is not a member of
the medical profession, did not preclude the transfer in
this case in that this transfer was an "involuntary" transfer

resulting

in

a

disqualification

of

the

individual

holding the stock and because the Stock Redemption Agreement
allowing

for

restrictions

did

not

address

"involuntary"

transfers during life but only applied in the event of death
or voluntary transfers such that once the stock was acquired
by

an

involuntary

disqualified

transfer

resulting

person, the only

remedy

_n

ownership

by

a

is to compel disso-

lution of the corporation pursuant to the applicable statute, to-wit:

Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13.

The Utah Court of Appeals found as a second matter that
the

Trial

Court's

judgment

was

readily

sustainable

by

further finding that "since the corporation did not provide
in its Articles, in its By-Laws, or by private agreement for
the repurchase or redemption of shares upon the disqualification of a shareholder, the statutory procedure set forth
in Utah Code Annotated § 16-11-13 would govern the repurchase :r redemption of shares in this case."

/

The rederorior.

value under that statute would be the reasonable fair value
as of the date of death or disqualification of the shareholder

and

liquidation

should the corporation

of

the

corporation

would

follow

fail to purchase the shares by the

end of the 90 day period.
During the end of November, 1988, the Petitioner did
Petition this Court for the granting of a Writ of Certiorari
from the Court of Appeals to the Utah Supreme Court.

On

January 11, 1989, this Court did grant a Writ of Certiorari
from the Utah Court of- Appeals to this Court

for review

under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Court of Appeals

Trial Court's
findings

that

did err

in sustaining

judgment by entering different and
the

Stock

Redemption

Agreement,

the

separate
although

valid, was inapplicable because of an involuntary transfer
and

the

rations
the

subsequent

ownership

of

stock by a disqualified

Stock

transfer

Redemption
by

operation

Agreement
of

law

the

professional

corpo-

shareholder when in fact
did

cover

meaning

the

this

type

of

disqualified

shareholder held the stock subject to the Stock Redemption
Agreement.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN SUSTAINING
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT FOR REASONS
SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT THAN THOSE RELIED ON
BY THE TRIAL COURT BY FINDING THAT THE
STOCK REDEMPTION AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH
VALID, WAS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE OF AN
INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER AND A SUBSEQUENT
DISQUALIFICATION ALLOWING THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION TO BE DISSOLVED UNDER
THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 16-11-13.
The Respondent in its Brief has argued two points in
requesting this Honorable Court to affirm and sustain the
decision

of

the Court

of Appeals

even though

that Court

affirmed the decision of the Trial Court on grounds different than those given for-

*-he decision of the Trial Court.

Those points consist of (1) That the Court of Appeals found
that the clear and unambiguous language of the Stock Repurchase Agreement excludes

involuntary

restrictions of the agreement; and
Court were

to

reverse

Repurchase

Agreement

and

find

applicable,

transfers within the
(2) that even if this

the

restrictions

that

the

in the

professional

corporation failed to tender a repurchase offer within the
terms and conditions of the Repurchase Agreement.
In regards to point

(1) as argued in the Appellant's

Brief, the Court of Appeals did find pursuant to Durkee v.
Durkee Moore, Inc. 248 NE.ld
involved

a c:\crce

case

139, ±42

that

9

(Mass. 1981) which

a .Court ordered

a-sicrment

pursuant to judgment of divorce was not a sale but rarher an
assignment by operation of law and that stock restrictions
were inapplicable to such Court ordered assignments.

But as

indicated in Appellant's Brief, Durkee did go on to find the
spouse receiving the stock by assignment through the divorce
could

not

transfer

the

stock

free

of

the

corporation's

charger restrictions, meaning that the spouse receiving the
stock by assignment rather than by "sale" was not subject to
the restriction but any subsequent transfer would be subject
to

the

restriction.

Again

Appellant's

Brief

argues

the

equitable powers of the Court, the terms of sale and assignment by operation

of law and

the

issues of voluntary

or

involuntary.
In further reply to this, Renberg v. Zarrow, 667 P. 2d
465

(Okla.

1983)

should

be

considered

indicating that stock was passed

more

en

point

in

by operation of lav: and

that any further transfer of the stock was subject to the
transfer

restrictions

imposed

by

stockholders

agreements

such that the case cited by the Appellant in his Brief and
the case cited by the Court of Appeals both recognize that
subsequent transfers, whether taken by operation of lav/ or
sale, were subject to Stock Repurchase Agreements,

Riche's

case is net distinguished by the Appellant's Court's finding
of clear arc unambiguous language thct excludes the m^oZun-

10

tary transfer from being subject to the restrictions of the
agreement but quite to the contrary, those two cases suggest
and

anply

between

support

informed

enforceable'1
trial

record

the

position

parties

and

that
their

"buy/sell

agreements

representatives

are

(as cited in Respondent's Brief, page 8 ) . The
is replete

with

evidence

that

a Chapter

7

Trustee, James Davis, and even the United States Bankruptcy
Court presiding over the case, Ralph Maybey, emphasized to
all potential buyers

the

fact

that the

stock

being

sold

would be subject to the Stock Redemption Agreement and no
guarantees were made either way.
In regards

tc

the

Respondent's

second

point

of

the

failure of the professional corporation to tender a repurchase amount, the Appellant's

original Brief

to the Utah

Supreir.e Court which was considered by the Court of Appeals
upon transfer, point 4 states as follows:
The Bankruptcy Court on December 3,
1981, gave notice to all creditors of
Dr.
Richard
Nilsson,
debtor,
that
Chauncey Michael son, M.D. had made an
offer to the Trustee in Bankruptcy,
James C. Davis, to pay the sum of
$1,000.00 cash for acquiring any interest of the Court, which it might have in
the 1,000 shares of stock which were
owned by Dr. Richard Nilsson in the
North Ocden Professional Corporation.
(R. 34)
The offer mace to the Trustee was made by and through
Chauncey

Michaelscn, M.D., en

1-1

behalf

of

the

North

Ogden

Professional Corporation at a time when the property was to
be transferred pursuant to a Court ordered
stock

or

Nilsson.

part

of

the

estate

"sale" of the

of the debtor, Dr. Richard

The offer made was a_i that was required by the

professional corporation to be made pursuant to the Stock
Redemption Agreement and to allow an individual professional
or non-professional qualified or unqualified to purchase the
property

beyond the par value assigned

Redemption Agreement

through

the Stock

after an offer had been made by the

corporation to purchase the stock for that value was improper and in violation of the Stock Redemption Agreement which
as previously argued should be applicable, to this transfer.
CONCLUS-wN
In conclusion, this Court

in

interpreting

Utah

Code

Annotated § 16-11-7 and § 16-11-13 with the case lav; cited
should find the Stock Redemption Agreement applicable to the
Respondent/Plaintiff,

and allow the corporation under

its

previously tendered offer to purchase or redeem the stock at
a par value of SI.00 per share or a total of $1,000.00.
DATED this 5th day of May, 1989.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of May, 1989, I
mailed four

\ 4) true and correct copies oi the above and

foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT by placing same in the
U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following:

John P. Sampson
Attorney for Respondent
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401

;

v^PEIfi^lC. VLAHOSy

